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ABSTRACT

Changes in Voting Behavior Along Partisan Lines Due to Extreme Weather Events
Linked to Climate Change
by
Daniel Brinkerhoff, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2022

Major Professor: Dr. Man-Keun Kim
Department: Applied Economics

This paper investigates the possible relationship between damages caused by
extreme weather events linked to climate change and partisan voting behavior for national
level offices. Using a Panel Regression with 7 control Variables and 4 Weather Damage
variables we attempt to find a net positive effect on Democratic Candidates running for the
House of Representatives and Senate elections between 2000-2018 for all 50 states. After
sensitivity analysis, there is insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that there is a
partisan voting effect caused by natural disasters linked to climate change.
(60 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Changes in Voting Behavior Along Partisan Lines Due to Extreme Weather Events
Linked to Climate Change
by
Daniel Brinkerhoff

This paper investigates the relationship between extreme weather events linked to
climate change and partisan voting behavior. Looking at House of Representative and
Senate elections in the US between 2000-2018 and comparing them to extreme damages
from droughts, flooding, tropical cyclones, and fire. Ultimately, we do not find a stable
relationship between weather damages and partisan voting behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates the possible relationship between damages caused by
extreme weather events linked to climate change and partisan voting behavior for national
level offices. The hypothesis being that as the consequences of ongoing climate change
becomes more salient, people will start to vote for the political party who voices their
concerns about climate change more regularly; this paper argues that is the Democratic
Party. This paper looks at the years between 2000-2018 and all State level national
elections (The House of Representatives and the Senate), and performs a Panel Regression
against 7 control variables and four Weather Damage Variables (wildfire, drought,
flooding, and tropical cyclones). The purpose of this investigation was to see if the growing
effects of climate change has already affected elections between 2000-2018.
Of the four variables, wildfire, drought, and tropical cyclones each showed some evidence
of a partisan voting effect in line with this paper's hypothesis. However, of those three,
only tropical cyclones withstood sensitivity analysis. This provides very weak evidence for
the hypothesis. Other potential areas of research would be to investigate if different regions
or states react differently to extreme weather, which is a possible explanation for the
patterns of statistical significance, but is outside the scope of this paper.
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LITERATUR REVIEW
Wildfire Exposure Increases pro-environment voting within Democratic but not
Republican Areas
Chat Hazlett and Matto Mildenberger from the University of California looked at
voting behavior on ballot initiatives for climate action. They look at how that voting
behavior changes based on the area’s exposure to wildfires and how far away the voter was
from the wildfire. Additionally, they estimated the impact of the wildfire voting effect
based on the region’s Democratic Party voter share.
Their paper attempts to answer the question “Will public support for climate
reforms increase as climate-related disasters make the short-term costs of inaction more
salient?” (Hazlett & Mildenberger, 2020, P1359). They look at precinct-level voting
outcomes for elections between 2002 and 2010 using data from the California Secretary of
State. They look at 4 different California Ballot initiatives that all focused on some form
of climate change initiative, from increasing taxes to pay out a clean energy subsidy, to
changes to energy regulations requiring increased utility purchases of renewable energy.
They compare the voting results to the “Monitoring Trends in Burn Severity” dataset
looking at wildfires that burned 5,000 acres or more within two years of the vote being
examined (Hazlett & Mildenberger, 2020, P1361).
Because areas that are prone to wildfires are different from areas less prone to
wildfires, (they estimate they have about an eighth the population) and sentiments change
over time, they add control variables to minimize the confounding effects for area and for
voting year. They use Democratic Vote Share of an area as a proxy for differing political
attitudes, such as partisan preferences. They also account for precipitation levels as that
can have multiple different effects, including decreasing wildfire chance (Hazlett &
Mildenberger, 2020, P1361).
They find that the areas “exposed to a wildfire larger than 5,000 acres have 6.0
percentage point higher support for environmental ballot initiatives” (Hazlett &
Mildenberger, 2020, P1361). They go on to look at how this effect changes when they
compare voting behavior to distance from a wildfire and find that people between 0-5
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kilometers from a wildfire have the highest support for the ballot initiatives and that support
decreases until it nearly disappears at 30 to 35 kilometers.
The last effect they model is if partisan lean has any effect on their findings. Using
their findings from the distance dataset, they break the groups into three categories, low,
medium, and high democratic share. They found that the effect of the wildfire is “heavily
concentrated in the most Democratic group and near zero in the most Republican group,
with the less extreme areas falling in between.” They do note that the different regions with
low, medium, and high democratic share may also differ in some other way correlated with
democratic voter share which is the true cause, and the party lean may only be a correlation.
One such possible variable being that the areas with higher Democratic voter share also
have a higher population density (Hazlett & Mildenberger, 2020, P1362).

Backing the Incumbent in Difficult Times: The Electoral Impact of Wildfires
Roberto Ramos and Carlos Sanz look at the wildfires impact on voting behavior in
Spain from 1983 to 2014. They look at elections at every level of government and
specifically measure the effect of the wildfire with regards to when they happened with
relation to the election (Ramos & Sanz, 2018).
One of the main premises of their paper is that wildfires are exogenous, or outside
the control of a politician. They use this to determine how voters behave through the lens
of 6 theories of voter behavior (Blind Retrospection, Voter Gratitude, Rational Updating,
Rally Effect, Partisan Effect, and Alignment Effect) and determine which theory most
closely matches their dataset.
Over the time period 1983 to 2014, they estimate Spain suffered more than 8,000
wildfires which affected at least 100 hectors in Spain with 3,000 municipalities enduring a
fire at least once. The responsibility to react to a fire is shared between three levels of
government, municipal, regional, and national. The authors use a dataset from the
“Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing, Food and Environment” which includes the date of
detection and extinction of each fire in the time period, the surface area burned by the fire
by municipality, and the cause of the fire (Ramos & Sanz, 2018, P478).
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They first look at the incumbent party’s voter share change since last election, and
how it relates to accidental wildfires which burned at least 1% of a municipalities area,
within a given timeframe prior to an election. They control for municipality and year to
capture any fixed effects that are time dependent or remain stable for any municipality
(Ramos & Sanz, 2018, P479-481).
They find an 8-percentage point increase to the incumbent party’s vote share if the
area experienced an accidental fire up to 9 months before the election, while any fire that
occurs 11 months prior to the election has no effect (Ramos & Sanz, 2018, 469). This effect
is only found at the municipal election level, and not on regional or national elections.
These findings are best described by the Rally Effect, due to the duration in time after the
fire (only 9 months), the directionality of the effect (positive rather than negative), and the
level of government effected by the wildfire (the municipal government is the one who
exerts the symbolic power after a natural disaster) (Ramos & Sanz, 2018, P490-491).
Natural Disasters, ‘Partisan Retrospection,’ and U.S. Presidential Elections
Boris Heersink, Jeffery a. Jenkins, Michael P. Olson, and Brenton D. Peterson from
Fordham University, University of Southern California, Washington University, and
University of Virginia respectively, investigate the effects of a natural disaster with regards
to pre-existing partisan lean. They look at Hurricane Sandy, specifically, and follow-up
with disasters between 1972-2004 (Heersink et. al. 2020).
The authors picked Hurricane Sandy because it caused major damage in 12 States
where at least 650,000 homes were damaged and 8.5 million households lost power with
estimates of damages over $50 billion dollars.

Sandy hit between October 26 and

November 2, days away from the November 6 election. The authors use SHELDUS data
that recorded damages for 332 counties and compare it to Obama’s two-party vote share in
2012 measured at the county level compared to their 2008 priors. The authors are
specifically interested in voting behavior changes in the “Contra-partisan” or voters from
a county that voted against the current in power administration in 2008, and “co-partisan”
or people from counties that voted for the current in power administration in 2008
(Heersink et. al. 2020, P8-14). They find that “voters from contra-partisan counties
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punished the incumbent president, while those in co-partisan counties either rewarded him
or stood pat.” The difference between the estimates were statistically significant and large
enough to matter at 1.2 percentage point difference (Heersink et. al. 2020, P21-22).
The authors also look at disasters and presidential elections between 1972 and 2004,
replicating a paper by Gasper and Reeves, changing some of the structure at the end to tie
in to their analysis of Hurricane Sandy. The purpose of this exercise was to ensure their
findings could be replicated in more datasets than just the one hurricane they were studying.
When using this new dataset, they found very similar results as their case study. Copartisan counties were mostly unaffected (or possibly positively affected) by disaster
damages, while Contra-Partisan counties punish the incumbent for damages (see fig 1)
(Heersink et. al. 2020, P15-22).

Figure 1
Co-Partisan vs Contra-Partisan Voting Effect of Disaster Damages

Estimated Co-Partisan vs Contra-Partisan effect on voting behavior for the incumbent’s reelection based on the severity of
disaster damages
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The Purpose of this Paper
This paper expands the works done by the other authors by broadening the subject
of research. While Hazlett et al look at the very local area, finding that voting behaviors
changes when a wildfire was personally experienced, this paper broadens the area to the
entire voting bloc. For an election is not won solely by a small area, but by the votes of
everyone in a bloc and the winning of an election is central to changing existing laws or
creating new policies. Even if a measurable change can be isolated through the narrowing
of the area of research, only in the event that those measurable changes can rise above the
natural variation does it have a meaningful impact. This paper looks at the overall field to
determine if Hazlett et al’s findings are meaningful when expanded out to the entire voting
bloc and over the elections of the last 20 years. This paper does not attempt to determine if
Hazlett et al’s findings will become relevant as natural disasters increase in frequency and
intensity as climate change continues to grow, where a majority of a voting bloc becomes
personally affected by those natural disasters.
Ramos et al’s research is the closest in relation to this paper as they specifically
address the Partisan Effect as it relates to their research. But this paper differs on two major
points. The first being their paper uses data from Spain between 1983-2014 and this paper
uses data from 2000-2018 from the United States. The second major difference is in their
assumptions. They assume that the different parties are not substantially different with
regards to wildfire or climate change, saying that people’s reaction to wildfires should be
uniform across partisan lines. Their paper focuses primarily on how wildfires affect the
incumbent. This paper focuses instead on how natural disasters (including wildfires, but
not limited to wildfires) affect elections along partisan lines and argues that one party has
positioned itself as the party who is more concerned about climate change while the other
positioned itself as skeptical of the effects and existence of climate change. Ramos et al
find that their data is most accurately explained by the theory of the Rally Effect and they
do not find any evidence of a Partisan Effect. While this paper finds more evidence for the
Blind Retrospection effect and insufficient evidence for the Partisan Effect.
The main focus of this paper is to look at voting behavior changes along partisan
lines. Heersink et al also focus on this subject. They focus on the presidential election, and
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how natural disasters change the voting behavior at the county level depending on the
partisan lean of the county. However, their findings are symmetrical. If there is a natural
disaster under a Republican administration, then Democratic leaning counties will punish
the incumbent. However, if there is a natural disaster under a Democratic Administration
Republican leaning counties will punish the incumbent. A symmetrical effect would, on
average, net out over a large enough sample over a long enough time. This paper focuses
on a broader area and attempts to find a net change in voting behavior along partisan lines.
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TYING PARTISANSHIP TO CLIMATE ACTION
The years 2000-2018 were selected both for availability of data and to attempt to
capture recent sentiment changes as climate change continues to evolve in the public eye
and solidify across partisan lines. While the partisan divide certainly entrenched itself
earlier with examples like the 1963 Clean Air Act passing with mostly Democratic Yes’s
vs Republican No’s (206 Democratic and 67 Republican yes’s vs 10 Democratic and 92
Republican no’s) 1 and Jimmy Carter putting solar panels on the White House2 and the
subsequent removal by Ronald Reagan (Murse, 2021). It is now more solidified than ever
before with 73 million votes for Former President Trump who said “The Concept of global
Warming was Created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing noncompetitive” in a tweet on 11/06/2012 (PolitiFact, 2016).
By the 2000 Presidential Election, Al Gore (Democrat) was already well known for
his Climate Activism, starting as early as his 1978-1980 House Term, he was holding
Congressional hearings on climate change, in 1992 he published the book “Earth in the
Balance”, pushed for a Carbon Tax while VP in 1993, and worked on and symbolically
signed the Kyoto Protocol (The Gradian, 2007). Gorge W. Bush, on the other hand hadn’t
prioritized climate change in his 2000 Presidential Campaign. Founder of Arbusto Energy
(Lardner & Romano, 1999), wasn’t explicitly against climate change, but didn’t emphasize
it as a critical issue either. His energy platform focused on energy independence rather than
Green Energy. This signifies a point where climate change action was a direct decision
presented to the voting public. It is for this reason the starting point of 2000 was selected
for the starting point of this analysis.
During President Bush’s administration (Republican), he announced that the US
will not implement the Kyoto Protocol, claiming that it would cause economic setbacks for
the US while the treaty did not do enough to curb emissions from developing nations (Kirby
2001). Instead, he proposed a new set of incentives and tax credits in a voluntary reduction
plan that would reduce the growth in emissions, but not decrease emissions overall

1
2

H.R. 6518. THE CLEAN AIR ACT. PASSAGE. -- House Vote #47 -- Jul 24, 1963.
Yale University, President Jimmy Carter's Remarks at White House Solar Panel Dedication Ceremony
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(Wallace, 2002). Most importantly, President Bush sent a public letter to Senator Hagel,
Helms, Craig, and Roberts explaining that the White House will not be regulating Carbon
Dioxide as a pollutant citing raising energy costs, and uncertain science around climate
change as his reason for this decision (Bush, 2001). The “Uncertainty on the science”
narrative was further established through alleged political interference with the work of
Government climate change scientists by the Bush White House where “145 FDA
scientists reported being asked, for non-scientific reasons, to inappropriately exclude or
alter technical information or change their conclusions in an FDA scientific document”
(Grifo, 2007. P1).
The 2004 official Democratic Party Platform has 13 paragraphs3 dedicated to
climate change as opposed to the Republican Party’s 1 paragraph.4 The 2004 official
Republican Party Platform states long term global climate change is a challenge, but not
one that requires emission regulations that may harm economic growth and jobs. The
Democratic Party Platform criticizes President Bush’s actions, states that climate change
is a scientific fact, rejects the “false choice between a healthy economy and a healthy
environment” stating that a healthy environment is necessary for a healthy economy, and
outlines 5 specific climate goals they will work towards achieving.
During President Obama’s Administration (Democrat), in 2009 the EPA reached a
deal with the Auto industry to impose carbon limits on cars and light trucks (EPA, 2021) 5.
In 2011, the EPA implemented mercury and air toxic standards requiring tighter pollution
controls on many power plants, and a Cross-State Air Pollution Rule further cutting
emissions (Eilperin. 2016). In 2015, Obama adopted the Paris Agreement along with many
other nations. The goal of the Paris Agreement is to limit global warming to well below 2
degrees Celsius.6 To achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, Obama’s White House
outlined an ambitious plan including clean power regulations, Green Energy expansions,

3
4
5
6

2004 Democratic Party Platform
Republican National Committee, 2004
Environmental Protection Agency. Regulations for Smog, Soot, and Other Air Pollution from Passenger Cars & Trucks
United Nations Climate Change. The Paris Agreement
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Clean Energy infrastructure, cutting energy waste, as well as adaptation to climate change
that is now unavoidable (White House, 2015).
One of President Trump’s (Republican) goals was to decrease regulations. He
issued an executive order that for every regulation added, two had to be removed (White
House, 2017). Climate regulations are commonly a target as seen by the Brookings
Institute’s “Tracking deregulation in the Trump Era”7 which records 85 deregulatory
actions related to the Environment. Ranging from changes to the Appliance energy
Conservation Standards increasing the burden to justify increasing the Trial Standard Level
(TSL), to decreasing Gas Pipeline Safety Requirements, exempting many pipelines from
specific provisions in these regulations. President Trump nominated Scott Pruitt to the
EPA. Prior to heading the EPA, Scott Pruitt had sued the EPA 13 times (Dolven, 2016) and
coauthored an article in 2016 questioning man-made global warming (Pruitt & Strange,
2016). Trump has also questioned, or outright denied, the existence of Global Warming
stating that it was created by the Chinese in order to make the US manufacturing noncompetitive (PolitiFact, 2016), calling Global Warming “bullshit” and claiming the planet
is actually freezing, and calling climate change a “hoax” and saying that we are having the
“coldest weather in years” in 2014 (Marcin, 2017).

7

Brookings. Tracking deregulation in the Trump era

11

TYING CLIMATE CHANGE TO VARIABLES
The difference between climate change and the natural variability of weather has
been studied for many decades. In this section, we will go over the connection between
droughts, flooding, tropical cyclones, and wildfires in the United States and anthropogenic
causes of climate change.

Human Drivers of Climate Change
Humans are causing CO2 levels to increase globally with the majority of those
increased emissions taking place after 1950 (Fig 2). Of the human caused CO2 emissions,
about 40% is still in the atmosphere with roughly 30% absorbed into the Ocean and the
remaining 30% absorbed by soil and vegetation (IPPC, 2014, P45). Global average
temperatures have increased between 0.6°C and 0.7°C over the period 1951 to 2010. Over
all continental regions (except Antarctica) humans are a substantial contributor to the
higher surface temperature (IPPC, 2014, P48).

Figure 2
Global Anthropogenic CO2 Emissions

IPPC, AR5 Synthesis Report – P. 45 – Showing the amount of human caused CO2 emissions from Fossil Fuels, Cement and
Flaring, vs Forestry and other land use
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Drought
Higher temperatures lead to quicker evaporation and higher water demand for
plants and animals. At the same time, it can change precipitation patterns (IPPC 2014,
P51), melting snowpack, and concentrate the year’s precipitation into fewer but heavier
downpours leading to more runoff (Climate Nexus, 2020), all of which can contribute to
more frequent or more severe droughts.8 North America is at risk of increased damages
due to droughts caused by a changing climate. Milly and Dunne estimate that half of the
16% decrease in the Colorado River between 2000 and 2017 is due to climate change. This
drying of the Colorado River increases the risk of sever water shortages (Milly & Dunne,
2020). Hoell, et al. estimates that the 2017 Great Plains drought was 50% more likely due
to higher levels of evaporation leading to loss of water in that region (evapotranspiration)
(Hoell, et. al. 2018). Weiss, et al. find that the higher temperatures lead to an increase in
the atmosphere’s ability to hold moisture (rather than drop it as rain) causing an increase
in severity of droughts after the year 2000 (Weiss, et. al. 2009). While no individual
drought can be tied to climate change, ongoing climate change increases the risk and
severity of droughts occurring (IPCC, 2014).

Flooding
From 1980 to 2005, flooding caused 4,586 deaths and 8 billion dollars a year in
damages (2011 dollars) (Melillo et. al. 2014). As the overall temperature increases, it has
an effect on precipitation and storm surges both of which increase the risk of flooding.
Warmer air holds more water. For every 1°C of warming, air contains 7 percent more water
vapor. This leads to a higher chance of precipitation and especially a higher chance of
extreme precipitation as storms gathers water vapor from a region 10-25 times larger than
the precipitation area which multiplies the effect of the increased moisture in the air
(Climate Nexus, 2020). This causes rivers to swell and increases flooding risk in those
areas most affected (Climate Nexus, 2020).

8

What causes drought? United States Geological Survey
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Figure 3
Change in Risk of River Flooding 1920-2008

Melillo J, Terese R, & Gary Y (2014 - P.26) This graphic shows the change in risk of river flooding from 1920 to 2008.

Tropical Cyclones/Hurricanes
Tropical cyclones have increased in frequency, duration, and intensity since the
1980’s increasing damages due to tropical cyclones (Melillo et. al. 2014). Higher Sea
surface temperature is estimated to increase the intensity of tropical cyclones in the North
Atlantic region by 16% for every 1°C increase (Fraza & Elsner, 2015). Hurricane Irma
maintained maximum wind speeds of over 180 mph for 37 hours, longer than any hurricane
on record (Samenow, 2017). These intense hurricanes are made even more damaging due
to an increase in storm surges (a temporary increase in sea level due to a storm) caused by
a sea level rise. Global Mean Sea Levels have increased by 189 millimeters (7.44 inches)
from 1900 to 2018 (Greicius, 2020) and has increased by 72.4 millimeters (2.85 inches)
between 2000 and 2020 (Ramsayer, 2021) signifying an increasing pace of sea level rise.
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Figure 4
Global Mean Sea Level Change

IPPC, AR5 Synthesis Report (P. 41) Mean global sea level change 1900-2010

The higher sea level leads to more flooding in coastal regions and more damaging
and intense storm surges (Climate Nexus, 2020). Miller, et al. estimated that Hurricane
Sandy flooded an area 70 square KM greater than what it would have with 1880 ocean
levels, effecting an additional 83,000 people (Miller et. al. 2013).

Wildfires
Wildfire Risk has increased in recent decades due to warmer temperatures and drier
conditions that lengthen wildfire seasons (Climate Nexus, 2020). Abatzoglou and Williams
estimate that human caused climate change contributed to a 75% increase in high fire
seasons, which lasted an average of nine days longer between 2000-2015. They also
estimated that human cause climate change led to an additional 4.2 million hectors of forest
fire between 1984-2015, which is doubling the amount otherwise expected (Abatzoglou &
Williams, 2016).
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Figure 5
Area Burned by Large Wildfires

Environmental Protection Agency. Climate Change Indicators: Wildfires- https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/climatechange-indicators-wildfires “This figure shows the distribution of acreage burned by large wildfires, based on the level of
damage caused to the landscape”

Wild Fires are not evenly distributed around the country, with the West receiving
substantially more wildfires than the Eastern half of the US (see fig 6).
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Figure 6
Distribution of Acreage Burned by State

Environmental Protection Agency. Climate Change Indicators: Wildfires- https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/climatechange-indicators-wildfires “This map shows the average number of acres burned in each state per year as a proportion of
that state’s total land area”
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THEORIES OF VOTER BEHAVIOR
Blind Retrospection is the theory that postulates that voters will reward or punish
incumbent administrations based on the change in their own personal wellbeing while the
administration is in power even if the cause of that change was entirely out of the control
of the incumbent administration (i.e. a natural disaster causes a decrease in wellbeing for
the voter) (Ramos & Sanz, 2018). Achen and Bartels investigate this theory by looking at
the droughts and floods in the United States between 1896-2000. They argue, if voters were
rationally updating (see next section) their preferences due to the competence of the
President’s response to a natural disaster, the natural disaster would occasionally help the
incumbent and occasionally hurt them as some presidents must perform above average than
others. They found, in general, droughts and floods have a negative effect on electoral
support for president’s party. Concluding that voters are not rationally updating their view
of the incumbent, but punishing them electorally for the climate event (Achen & Bartels,
2004).

Rational Updating this theory proposes that a voters gauge an administrations
reaction to (or ability to mitigate though prevention) a natural disaster and use this
information to update their opinions of the aptitude of that administration. If an Incumbent
does a very good job during a very hard time, they will be electorally rewarded for their
above average performance (Ramos & Sanz, 2018). Ashworth et al. create a model that
theorizes that the electoral chances of an incumbent have the ability to increase or decrease
after a disaster based on several dimensions. It depends on the expectations people have of
the incumbent (if the incumbent is leading the challenger or if the challenger is leading the
incumbent) and it depends on if the disaster mutes information or reveals it (a high-profile
case or highly visible event has high information, but low visibility event has low
information). The final piece is the intensity of the event, the greater the intensity the more
of an effect the combination between the two, expectation and information, have on the
incumbent’s election result (Ashworth et. al. 2017).
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Voter Gratitude distinguishes itself by asserting that voters will reward the
incumbent after a disaster if aid is rendered in the form of direct disaster relief to the
individual, relief to the local municipality from a higher government body, or from
favorably rezoning lands after the disaster passes (Ramos & Sanz, 2018). This differs from
Rational Updating where the voters use the disaster as an opportunity to gauge the
effectiveness of the incumbent administration and instead reward the incumbent
administration regardless of their aptitude based solely on transfers made in their favor.
Furthermore, this differs from Blind Retrospection as under Blind Retrospection a voter
would only look at their total change in wellbeing and vote using that metric. Healy and
Malhotra found that $1 in prevention spending was worth approximately $15 in relief
spending yet relief spending was positively correlated to incumbent voter share and
spending on preparedness was not statistically significant (Healy & Malhotra, 2009). Taken
together, it strongly implies that a forward thinking Administration who prevents the need
for relief spending by investing in preparedness will perform worse than an Administration
who spends large sums on relief after a disaster (a point against Rational Updating and a
point for Voter Gratitude). Bechtel and Hainmueller estimated the massive policy response
to the flooding in 2002 Elbe Germany increased the vote shares for the incumbent party by
7 percentage points in the 2002 election and with 25% of that effect carrying over to the
2005 election (Bechtel & Hainmueller, 2011). This shows that the Voter Gratitude effect
may provide benefits even past the short run.

Rally Effect is when the incumbent sees electoral rewards from the voter base as a
reflexive response to a challenging time (Ramos & Sanz, 2018). The Rally Effect differs
from the previous effects because it does not rely on changes in the voter’s personal
wellbeing (Blind Retrospection), the incumbent’s ability to handle the situation (Rational
updating), or whether or not the incumbent provided relief to those effected. Instead, it is
just a blanket improvement for the incumbent during hard times. Lazarev et al. conducted
a survey after the extremely harsh fire season of Summer 2010 in Russia. They found a
sharp increase in voter support at all levels of government that could not fully be explained
by Voter Gratitude or Rational Updating (Lazarev et. al. 2014). Hetherington and Nelson
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write about the Rally Effect experienced by President Bush after the September 11 terrorist
attack. There was a 5 from September 10, 2001 to September 21, 2001 (from 51% to 90%
approval) and which dropped down to a 17-point increase (68% approval) by November
of 2002 (13 months later) (Hetherington & Nelson, 2003). Which also shows that the Rally
effect is fairly short lived.

Partisan Effect is the theory that the events (Climate Disasters) will cause voters
to move towards a specific party. The hypothesis being that as climate change continues to
increase the likelihood and severity of damages due to climate events, people will start to
drift towards the party with the stronger platform on combating and adapting to climate
change. The Partisan Effect differs from the other effects in that it does not focus on who
the incumbent is, but instead focuses on the party as a whole. The partisan Effect can
overlap with Voter Gratitude and Rational Updating if there is a divergence in how one
party handles a disaster over the competing parties handling of disasters. i.e. if one party is
more generous in providing relief (more voter gratitude) or if one party is scored as more
competent by the voter base (rational updating) then the partisan effect and the other effects
my overlap.
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DATA
This section describes the sources of data, how it has been changed, and possible
weaknesses of the data used in the analysis. See Appendix A for a data table describing the
Median, Average, Min, Max and units of the variables used.

Voting Data: The main focus of this paper, and the variable of interest, is the
percentage of votes for the Democratic Party candidates in national level elections. This
comprises of 3 separate groups; House of Representatives, Senate, and the Precedency. The
Precedency dataset was ultimately removed due to only having 5 elections worth of data
(00, 04, 08, 12, 16) which was insufficient for analysis. The main hypothesis (that
Democratic Party vote share increases as we experience natural disasters linked to climate
change) should be stable across all three election types. While they may differ in
magnitude, they should not differ in directionality (positive should stay positive, negative
stay negative).
All three datasets come from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab, version 8.0,
with John Curiel and Alexander Agadjanian as the most recent Contributors. All votes for
a Democratic Party candidate are combined, all Democratic adjacent parties (Democratic
– Nonpartisan League, Democratic – Farmer-Labor, etc.) were not counted. Any election
that resulted in a runoff election, only the runoff election was counted. Any candidate who
ran under multiple parties (or were a write-in in some locations) had their vote totals
combined.

Potential weaknesses:
1. For the House of Representatives, districts change every 10 years. This means that
Alabama district 1, in 2002 is not the exact same location as Alabama district 1 in
2012.
a. Some States gain a new district as they gain more House of Representatives
due to population change, while other States lose a district.
2. There is not always a competitive race in a district. A candidate can run unopposed
and receive 100% of the vote. This means the Voting Variable is not linear as the
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movement from 45 to 55 (which likely turns a loss into a win) is different than the
movement from 90 to 100 (which means the candidate ran unopposed) despite the
movement only being 10 percentage points.
3. Each county has different rules on elections, and these rules can change with each
election. By using a panel regression, it attempts to net out all of those individual
effects. But some residual noise will remain and would not be controlled by this
dataset.
4. Elections are not always held at the same time. The other datapoints (especially the
weather damages data) are a snapshot at a specific point in time which may not
always align with an individual election.
a. Most elections are towards the end of the year, and most datapoints
(especially the climate data) are resolved before those elections. However,
if there was a major drought, flood, hurricane, or wildfire, in late November
or December or if an election is held early in the year, it would take place
prior to the weather event.
Weather Damages: Data comes from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s (NOAA) National center for Environmental Information. They put
together a “Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters” list which includes high dollar
disasters in drought, flooding, tropical cyclones, and wildfires which is the main data
source for this paper. This data is broken up by State, provided in ranges (i.e. 5-100 million
dollars) for each weather event and State for each year in the dataset. This paper simplified
the data to only include the minimum damages rather than the maximum or an average (i.e.
the $5 million instead of $100 million). During sensitivity testing it was found that the
overall significance, both in magnitude and statistical significance, was unchanged based
on using the minimum or maximum dollar amounts as it is essentially a scaler. However,
this is an important attribute to keep in mind when interpreting the coefficients and the
effect the coefficients have on the variable of interest.
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Potential Weaknesses:
1. Because the data is in the form of broad ranges, one cannot have a precise
interpretation of the coefficients.
2. Weather damages are calculated at the State level, while voting for the House of
Representatives is at the Congressional District Level.
3. The data only looks at very large and damaging climate events, while a large
number of smaller climate effects may also play a role in voting behavior.
4. This dataset does not include mitigation, prevention, or adaptation. As an example,
ongoing droughts due to climate change may have forced farmers to abandon some
cropland or switch to a lower yielding crop to adapt to the consistent lack of water.
This would not show up in the data as it is not damages, even though it does cause
harm.

Control variables: The following are a list of Control Variables used.
Incumbency: If a candidate was in office at the time of running, they should be
marked as an incumbent. This value was constructed off of the MIT Voting Data. If a
candidate had won the election prior, then ran again for the same seat, they were marked
as an incumbent. Candidates that were put into position as a temporary measure (i.e. to
replace a Representative who died while in office) were not counted as an incumbent until
after they won an election to gain the office. This data is at the individual election level
(State and district)
Education: Education data was built from the National Center for Education
Statistics. Each year downloaded separately from Chapter 1, Educational Attainment by
State and combined. Data contains several inconsistencies. Years 2001, and 2003 were
missing at the time of download. 2001 and 2003 in the dataset were an average of 2000
and 2002 (2002 and 2004 respectively). Farther more, 2007-2010 used a 3-year rolling
average instead. This means the coefficient on Education should not be used for any
analysis and the purpose of the Education Data is solely to capture some of the error term.
This data is at the state level.
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Turnout: Turnout was built using voting data from the MIT Election Data and
Science Lab and dividing it by state population which came from the National Cancer
Institute – Population Data 1969-2019.
Old Age Dependency: Old Age Dependency is created using the data from the
National Cancer Institute – Population Data 1969-2019 by dividing the 65+ age population
by the total population. This data is at the State level.
Race: Race data is created using the data from the National Cancer Institute –
Population Data 1969-2019 by dividing the Non-white population by the total population
(technically by combining the “Black” and the “other” race categories together, and
dividing by the total population). This data is at the State level.
Income: Income per capita was calculated by using the total state income from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis – Regional Data: GDP and Personal Income – SQINC1 that
provides total state income (current dollars), then dividing it by the state population using
the National Cancer Institute – Population Data 1969-2019 – dataset. This data is at the
State level.
Datasets
There are three datasets used in this paper. One for the Presidential General
Election, one for the Senate General Election, and one for the House of Representatives
General Election. The Presidency and the Senate are organized by Year and State. Meaning
there is one variable for Alabama 2004. While the House of Representatives use Year and
State District. Meaning there is one variable for Alabama, District 1, 2004.
All three are organized as panel regressions using a “within” Fixed Effect. A
random effect model assumes that the State variable is uncorrelated with any of the control
variables or the Weather Damage variables. We know this to be false as some states have
higher educations, higher income, and are affected by different climate events. California
suffers more from wildfires and Texas and Florida suffer more from Tropical Cyclones. A
Fixed effect model is not limited by this assumption and instead focuses on the changes
inside each variable. While California will have a different per capita income as Alabama,
this Panel Regression method will look at how those variables change inside their
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respective states. This yields substantially higher Standard Errors, but is necessary. The
Hausman test was used to confirm this conclusion.
The hypothesis that there is a Net Partisan Effect on damage caused by weather
events linked to climate change which results in a higher vote percentage for the
Democratic Party SHOULD remain stable between the 3 types of elections. By looking at
all three types of elections, it can provide evidence in the form of sensitivity testing. While
the hypothesis does not predict that the overall magnitude would remain the same, it does
predict that the directionality (positive or negative effect) should remain stable across all
three datasets.
Two main Regressions were run each for the Senate and House of Representatives
(the Presidential data set was dropped due to insufficient data). The Basic Regression 1
was the panel regression with all 11 variables (7 control variables and 4 weather damage
variables). Regression 2 differs by multiplying the Incumbency variable to each of the
Weather Damage variables in order to capture any effect the weather event has on
incumbency specifically. Other supplementary regressions were run for analysis and
sensitivity testing purposes. Regressions splitting the US into 3 regions the Western States,
Central States, and Eastern States. There were also regressions run omitting the data from
a single state to test the sensitivity of the model to small variations.
Presidency
The Presidency data set used the election data from 5 elections (2000, 2004, …,
2016), and 51 states (includes DC). It was ultimately removed from analysis due to
insufficient data.
Senate
Because the Senate is a 6-year term, it has some small variations on how many
Senate Level elections are run each year. This ranges from 30 elections in 2000, 2002,
2006, and 2018 all the way up to 34 in 2016. All told, there are 10 Senate elections between
2000 and 2018 with states ranging between 4 and 7 elections. The Senate Data set used
314 observations, has an adjusted R2 of 0.210 and drought, tropical cyclone, and wildfire
reach statistical significance on its Basic Regression 1 (see Appendix B).
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House
The House of Representatives data set has the most observations as they are held
every two years and each representative must run for re-election every 2 years. There are
10 elections between 2000 and 2018. With individual states varying widely in the number
of overall elections held where States with more representatives like California saw 513
elections over the time period and states like Alaska only have 10. However, the Panel
Regression is done at the State and District level where most State Districts had 10
elections. Some State Districts received less as redistricting in 2000, and 2010 may create
new districts or remove existing ones or some elections did not have a Democratic Party
participant. Even at the State District level, it still has the most elections per area reviewed.
The House Data set has 4,032 observations and an Adjusted R2 of .213 (see Appendix B).
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METHEDOLOGY
This section details the Regressions ran and the outputs found as well as tests that
were used for sensitivity analysis in greater detail. The first set of regressions are detailed
below. They include 7 control variables, 4 climate damage variables, and the Panel
Regression variable for each State.

Senate Regression:
𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑦
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑦 + 𝛽2 (𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙)𝑠𝑦 + 𝛽3 (𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑠𝑦
+ 𝛽4 (𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡) + 𝛽5 (𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦)𝑠𝑦 + 𝛽6 (𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒)𝑠𝑦
+ 𝛽7 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑠𝑦 + 𝛽8 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑦 + 𝛽9 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑦
+ 𝛽10 (𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒)𝑠𝑦 + 𝛽11 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑦 + 𝛼𝑠 + 𝑢𝑠𝑦
The sy subscript is to indicate a variable for a specific State on a Specific Year.
Because each state has 2 senators with 6 year terms, every 2 years ~66% of states hold a
Senate Election. Every variable is measured by State and Year.
𝛼𝑠 is the panel regression Fixed Effects Model variable. This is necessary to prevent
confounding effects due to each States local effects. A Fixed Effect model was used instead
of a Random Effects model for two reasons. First, due to the results of the Hausman test pvalue = 0.009628. Second, due to prior knowledge that the assumptions of a Random
Effects model, that the independent variables are uncorrelated with the Random Effects
variable State, are not satisfied in this dataset.
𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑦 is a value between 0-100 and is the percentage of the vote that went to the
Democratic Party Candidates.
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑡 is 1 if the candidate won their last election for the seat they currently
hold, and 0 otherwise. It only tracks the incumbency of the Democratic Candidate, a third
variable “no Incumbency” was not added due to data constraints. While a “1” always means
the Democratic candidate is the incumbent, a zero either means they are faced against a
Republican Incumbent, or it is an open race with no incumbency.
𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 is a value between 0-100 which is the amount of the adult
population with less than a high school education.
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𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒 is a value between 0-100 which is the amount of the adult
population with a bachelor’s degree or more.
𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 is a value between 0-100 and is calculated by Population 65
and older divided by entire population.
𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒 is a value between 0-100 and is calculated by all non-white population
divided by total population.
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 is the total state income divided by the total state population.
𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡, 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑒 are the damages in 100
millions over the last 2 years (since the last election).

House Regression:
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑑 𝑦
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑑 𝑦 + 𝛽2 (𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙)𝑠𝑦 + 𝛽3 (𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑠𝑦
+ 𝛽4 (𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡) + 𝛽5 (𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦)𝑠𝑦 + 𝛽6 (𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒)𝑠𝑦
+ 𝛽7 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎)𝑠𝑦 + 𝛽8 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑦 + 𝛽9 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑦
+ 𝛽10 (𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒)𝑠𝑦 + 𝛽11 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑦 + 𝛼𝑠𝑑 + 𝑢𝑠𝑑 𝑦
These values are the same as the Senate Regression except for the following ways.
The sd variable is “State District” as each state is broken down to smaller Congressional
District. Only the Vote, incumbent, and the Fixed Effect variable 𝛼, had data available at
the State District level. See Appendix B for the output sheet with the calculated
coefficients.
A Fixed Effect was again used for the House Regression for the same two reasons.
First, due to the results of the Hausman test p-value = 2.2*10-16. Second, due to prior
knowledge that the assumptions of a Random Effects model, that the independent variables
are uncorrelated with the Random Effects variable State, are not satisfied in this dataset.
The Precedential Regression was abandoned due to insufficient data. Only 5
elections were held between 2000 and 2018.
Using the same data as the previous regression, we create a second set of
regressions. These regressions mirror the originals, but multiply the Incumbent variable to
the Weather Damage variables to determine if there is a correlation between the
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Incumbent’s electoral performance and the Damages due to weather extremes. If Blind
retrospection is dominant, you would expect a significant negative impact on an
incumbent’s reelection, Rational Updating will sometimes be positive and sometimes be
negative depending on the voters’ expectations and their feelings on how well the
incumbent handled the crisis, and if Voter Gratitude is dominant, we would expect to see
a positive impact from the weather damages. This regression is unable to differentiate
between these effects, but instead looks at the net result to determine if there is a stable
overall effect one way or the other.
The results of the second regression (see Appendix B), they suggest that an
incumbent is punished by droughts and wildfires indicating the Blind Retrospection is
likely the primary effect. While tropical cyclones tend to increase support for the
Incumbent which suggests that the Rally Effect and/or Voter Gratitude are the primary
effects.
All Weather Damage Variables are uncorrelated with each other and are
uncorrelated with any of the control variables. See Appendix B. Many of the control
variables are correlated with themselves and with time. Income is correlated with higher
levels of education, which is trending up over time.

During the creation of the dataset, many decisions had to be made.
•

The variable “percent female” which was the percent of the population recorded
as female was dropped due to low variability and no statistical significance.

•

The weather damage variable “Sever Storm” was dropped because it included
weather events not linked to climate change (such as tornados).

•

The weather damage variables came from a source that provided a range of
damages for each event in each State as follows (0-5; 5-100; 100-250; 250-500;
500-1,000; 1,000-2,000; 2,000-5,000; 5,000-10,000; 10,000-20,000) measured in
Million dollars, CPI adjusted 2021.
o Regressions were used comparing the minimum value, maximum value,
and both values at the same time and found that there was very little
variation in results depending on which method was used.

29

▪

The minimum and maximum values were highly correlated with
one another and increased standard errors.

o Ultimately, the “minimum value” was used for the regression analysis
•

The weather event damages could be calculated in two ways. By looking at only
the weather event damages in the year of the election, or adding all weather event
damages since the last election year (2 years vs 1 year of data). The “Since” data
set included more variation in the explanatory variable and had similar standard
errors/statistical significance. Either could have been used and both have
empirical backing but we ultimately went with “Since” because a decision had to
be made.
o The “Since” data and “year of” data were highly correlated with one
another and increased standard error when both were included at the same
time. It was not chosen for this reason.

•

States were consolidated into 1 of 3 regions for deeper analysis. The states fall
into the following regions
o Region 1, Western States (ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, COLORADO,
IDAHO, MONTANA, NEVADA, NEW MEXICO, OREGON, UTAH,
WASHINGTON, WYOMING)
o Region 2, Central States (ARKANSAS, IOWA, KANSAS, LOUISIANA,
MISSOURI, NEBRASKA, NORTH DAKOTA, OKLAHOMA, SOUTH
DAKOTA, TEXAS, MINNESOTA)
o Region 3, Eastern States (ALABAMA, CONNECTICUT, DELAWARE,
FLORIDA, GEORGIA, ILLINOIS, INDIANA, KENTUCKY, MAINE,
MARYLAND, MASSACHUSETTS, MICHIGAN, MISSISSIPPI, NEW
HAMPSHIRE, NEW JERSEY, NEW YORK, NORTH CAROLINA,
OHIO, PENNSYLVANIA, RHODE ISLAND, SOUTH CAROLINA,
TENNESSEE, VERMONT, VIRGINIA, WEST VIRGINIA,
WISCONSIN)
o

4, OCONUS States (ALASKA, HAWAII)
▪

Region 4 was excluded from analysis due to its restrictive nature.
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FINDINGS
The goal of this paper is to determine if there is an overall net effect on national
level elections from extreme weather events linked to climate change. The hypothesis being
that if there is a strong, national level, partisan effect, then there will need to be a change
in party platforms or one party will win more elections as climate change progresses. The
reason this paper focuses on the net effect is that, in each election, there is only ever one
winner. If the sum of all effects comes to zero overall, then it has no practical effect on an
election. The work of previous authors who narrow down their research to only recent
weather effects, or to voters who were very close to the damages of a weather event, is not
futile as it can be used to guide decision making and recommend actions for political
leaders and climate activists. But that is not the purpose of this paper, which is primarily
concerned with the overall, or net, effect in broad terms.

Wildfire
The wildfire data is not evenly distributed among the states. The Western states
account for 93% of the total wildfire damage and California accounts for 88% of the
wildfire damage in the West.

Figure 7
Wildfire Damages - $100’s of Millions
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Figure 8
Wildfire Damages by Region - $100’s of Millions
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Figure 9
Wildfire Damages Excluding California - $100’s of Millions
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As you can see in the three graphs, California dominates the data set, but once
removed, there is still a general increase over the remaining US states over time.
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Table 1
Partial Regression Output for Wildfire Data, Senate and House

Senate

Regression 1

Regression 2

Wildfire
Incumbent * Wildfire

0.133***

1.631***
-1.492***

House

Regression 1

Regression 2

Wildfire
Incumbent * Wildfire
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

-0.002

0.017*
-0.028***

Partial Regression table - See Appendix B for complete output table

When the standard Regression 1 is done with all control variables and all 4 weather
damage variables, only The Senate Dataset sees a statistical significance. When California
is removed, there is no longer any correlation between the large damaging fires and voting
behavior at the National General Election level. It is this papers conclusion that if only one
region out of the 50 regions sees statistical significance, then the overall effect does not
pass sensitivity testing as one cannot extrapolate a general trend to one outlier.
When Regression 2 is run, where the weather damage variables are multiplied by
the incumbency dummy variable, wildfire damages INCREASES the Democratic Voter
share, BUT decreases the incumbent’s voter share. This implies that a Blind retrospection
is the dominant force for the incumbent, but there is some Partisan Effect leading more
people to vote Democrat after the fire. However, just like the Standard Regression 1 this
effect does not remain after California is removed. While the hypothesized effect is found
in the data, it does not pass sensitivity analysis. The ultimate conclusion that this paper
does not find significant evidence that wildfire damages cause a net Partisan Effect on
National Level Elections.
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Drought
The drought damages data is somewhat evenly distributed with the largest single
state only encompassing 20% of the overall drought damages and the top 4 only reaching
42% of the drought damages. The damages are also evenly distributed across regions, with
different spikes throughout the years.

Figure 10
Drought Damages - $100’s of Millions
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Figure 11
Drought Damages by Region - $100’s of Millions
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Table 2
Partial Regression Output for Drought Data, Senate and House

Senate

Regression 1

Regression 2

Drought
Incumbent * Drought

0.365***

0.044
-0.278

House

Regression 1

Regression 2

Drought
Incumbent * Drought

-0.040*

0.018
-0.131***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Partial Regression table - See Appendix B for complete output table

Looking at the House Dataset Regression 2, we see that high drought damages hurts
the incumbent’s reelection while having no measurable effect on the Democratic Voter
share. These results provide evidence for Blind Retrospection to be the primary force, and
that there is no evidence of a Partisan Effect for House of Representatives elections.
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The Senate dataset does find statistical significance in the standard Regression 1
where the democratic candidate receives more votes after a heavy drought. Additionally,
unlike the House dataset, it does not find any statistically significant effect on the
incumbent’s reelection chances in Regression 2. The statistically significant result in the
Standard Regression 1 seems to be linked to one datapoint in California 2016 where there
was a very damaging drought and no challenger to the Democratic Senate election in 2016
(causing the Vote variable to be 100). If we remove California from the Senate dataset, it
loses the statistical significance.
The ultimate conclusion is that the drought damages fail to provide evidence for
any Partisan Effect. There does appear to be some evidence for drought damages harming
the reelection of an incumbent House Representative which would fit the Blind
Retrospection theory of voter behavior.

Flooding
The flooding damages dataset is concentrated in two states, for two years. 37% of
the total damages were incurred by Louisiana in 2016 and a further 19% was incurred by
Iowa in 2008. That means 56% of all variation are seen only in 2 major events, all focused
on the Central United States.
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Figure 12
Flooding Damages - $100’s of Millions
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Figure 13
Flooding Damages by Region - $100’s of Millions
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Table 3
Partial Regression output for Drought data, Senate and House

Senate

Regression 1

Regression 2

Flooding
Incumbent * Flooding

0.047

0.032
0.073

House

Regression 1

Regression 2

Flooding
Incumbent * Flooding

-0.033

-0.052
0.071

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Partial Regression table - See Appendix B for complete output table

With low variation, there were very high Margins of error, and no statistical
significance was found. To avoid the outliers in the Central states, we can split the 2
datasets (Senate and House) across the 3 regions for both the Standard Regression 1 and
Regression 2, this creates 12 new regressions. Of these 12 new regressions, we find only
the Eastern States, on Regression 2, to have any statistical significance and only for the
Senate races.
In order for the data to support the hypothesis of this paper, we would expect to see
consistent results from all regressions. With only 1 regression of 16 finding any statistical
significance, we determine that the flooding damages data does not pass sensitivity analysis
and fails to provide evidence for the hypothesis.

Tropical Cyclone
The tropical cyclone dataset has a large number of states that have suffered little to
no major damage from tropical cyclones. This is expected as only costal states encounter
tropical cyclones and of those, 70% of the damage is concentrated in Texas and Florida.
The overall Trend is upward with a very large spike in 2018. Nearly all of the data is in the
East and Central US regions (due to Texas being counted as a ‘Central region’), with almost
no damages in the Western US Region.
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Figure 14
Tropical Cyclone Damages - $100’s of Millions
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Figure 15
Tropical Cyclone by Regions - $100’s of Millions
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Table 4
Partial Regression Output for Tropical Cyclone Data, Senate and House

Senate

Regression 1

Regression 2

Tropical Cyclone
Incumbent * Tropical Cyclone

0.018**

0.023***
-0.022

House

Regression 1

Regression 2

Tropical Cyclone
Incumbent * Tropical Cyclone

0.005***

0.003*
0.009***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Partial Regression table - See Appendix B for complete output table

Both the House and the Senate Datasets show evidence of a Partisan effect where
voters vote for Democratic candidates after experiencing damages due to a tropical
cyclone. This partisan effect remains stable across all 3 regions and for the entire US, for
both the Senate and the House races. This effect remains stable even after removing Texas,
the state with the largest spike in tropical cyclone Damages in 2018. Of all 4 climate
damage variables, this is the only one that remained statistically significant after sensitivity
testing.
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CONCLUSION
The ultimate conclusion of this paper is that there is insufficient evidence to
conclude that damages incurred by extreme weather events disproportionately shift votes
towards the Democratic Party at the national level. While this paper found some evidence
to support its hypothesis, the evidence was inconsistent and did not hold up to sensitivity
testing. Of the other voting theories discussed, it indicates that Blind Retrospection is
dominant in drought and wildfires damaged areas while Voter Gratitude or the Rally effect
are more dominant in areas suffering from tropical cyclone, and flooding does not appear
to have any effect on Senate or House elections.
Other areas of investigation may be to test if different regions or states react to
Extreme weather events differently. This would explain why some areas saw statistical
significance while others did not. One could also change the variables used. This paper
used only the damages (measured in dollars) of the largest weather events in the nation. It
is possible smaller events would paint a more accurate picture. Other measures for
damages, like acers burned, residential houses destroyed, life loss or injury sustained, may
all yield different and more accurate results. It is also possible that voter behavior changes
only when a person personally experiences the extreme weather event, and state level data
is too broad to see any relevant effect that raises above background noise. While this paper
provides no policy suggestions, this paper recommends additional research into the topic
over the years as the effects of climate change continue to increase.
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APPENDIX A – DATA TABLES
Table 5
Data Table for Senate Dataset
Senate

Description

region

1 = Western, 2 = Central, 3 = Eastern

year

Calendar year

vote

% vote total for Democratic Candidates

incumbant

1 = Incumbent, 0 = Not Incumbent

Units

Median

Average

Min

Max

2000

2018

10.4

100.0

Dummy
Year
Percentage

48.7

Dummy

47.9
0.4

% of population reported to have less than high
less_then_highschool

school education

Percentage

12.4

13.0

6.6

22.9

Percentage

27.3

27.8

15.3

44.4

% of population reported to have a Bachelor's
bachelor_or_more

degree or more

turnout

Votes divided Population

Percentage

37.0

37.1

1.2

75.9

oldage_dependency

Persons 65+ divided by total population

Percentage

13.6

13.8

6.1

20.6

non_white

non-white population divided by total population

Percentage

15.7

18.3

2.1

75.7

income_per_capita

State Reported GDP divided by population

$1,000

39.9

40.9

21.9

75.6

0.0

1.8

0.0

40.0

0.0

0.9

0.0

100.1

0.0

11.1

0.0

1000.0

0.0

1.4

0.0

300.0

NOAA "Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate
drought_since

Disasters" reported for drought damages

NOAA "Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate
flooding_since

Disasters" reported for flooding damages

NOAA "Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate
tropical_cyclone_since Disasters" reported for tropical cyclone damages

NOAA "Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate
wildfire_since

Disasters" reported for wildfire damages

$100
Million

$100
Million

$100
Million

$100
Million
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Table 6
Data Table for House Dataset
House

Description

region

1 = Western, 2 = Central, 3 = Eastern

year
vote
incumbant

Calandra year
% vote total
Candidates

Units

Median

Average

Max

2000

2018

5.3

100.0

Dummy
Year

for

Min

Democratic
Percentage

49.9

52.4

1 = Incumbent, 0 = Not Incumbent

Dummy

less_then_highschool

% of population reported to have less
than high school education

Percentage

14.0

14.4

6.0

22.9

bachelor_or_more

% of population reported to have a
Bachelor's degree or more

Percentage

28.0

28.6

15.3

44.4

Percentage

33.6

33.6

16.5

58.0

Percentage

13.3

13.5

5.7

20.6

turnout

0.4

oldage_dependency

Votes divided Population
Persons 65+ divided by
population

non_white

non-white population divided by total
population

Percentage

19.6

20.2

2.1

75.7

income_per_capita

State Reported GDP divided by
population

$1,000

40.9

42.2

21.9

75.6

drought_since

NOAA "Billion-Dollar Weather and
Climate Disasters" reported for drought
damages

$100
Million

0.1

2.9

0.0

55.0

flooding_since

NOAA "Billion-Dollar Weather and
Climate Disasters" reported for flooding
damages

$100
Million

0.0

1.1

0.0

100.1

tropical_cyclone_since

NOAA "Billion-Dollar Weather and
Climate Disasters" reported for tropical
cyclone damages

$100
Million

0.0

23.2

0.0

1000.0

wildfire_since

NOAA "Billion-Dollar Weather and
Climate Disasters" reported for wildfire
damages

$100
Million

0.0

5.1

0.0

300.0

total
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Table 7
Senate Correlation Table
tropical_
less_then_ bachelor_
oldage_
income_ drought_ flooding cyclone_ wildfire_
year vote incumbant highschool or_more turnout dependency non_white per_capita since
_since since
since
year
1.00 -0.04
0.04
-0.38
0.38
0.06
0.56
0.10
0.74
0.04
0.08
0.06
0.09
vote
0.04 1.00
0.67
0.10
0.29
0.02
0.14
0.21
0.19
0.03
0.00
0.02
0.21
incumbant
0.04 0.67
1.00
-0.06
0.24
0.06
0.17
0.12
0.20
-0.09
-0.01
-0.06
0.07
less_then_highschool 0.38 0.10
-0.06
1.00
-0.52
-0.38
0.24
0.21
-0.49
0.11
0.02
0.12
0.06
bachelor_or_more
0.38 0.29
0.24
-0.52
1.00
0.15
0.11
0.09
0.75
-0.04
-0.04
0.02
0.08
turnout
0.06 0.02
0.06
-0.38
0.15
1.00
0.15
0.22
0.10
-0.03
0.06
-0.06
0.07
oldage_dependency
0.56 0.14
0.17
-0.24
0.11
0.15
1.00
0.05
0.37
-0.10
0.05
0.03
0.00
non_white
0.10 0.21
0.12
0.21
0.09
-0.22
0.05
1.00
0.13
-0.06
0.06
0.05
0.03
income_per_capita
0.74 0.19
0.20
-0.49
0.75
0.10
0.37
0.13
1.00
0.01
0.03
0.06
0.14
drought_since
0.04 0.03
-0.09
0.11
-0.04
-0.03
0.10
0.06
0.01
1.00
-0.01
0.18
0.05
flooding_since
0.08 0.00
-0.01
0.02
-0.04
0.06
0.05
0.06
0.03
-0.01
1.00
-0.01
0.08
tropical_cyclone_since 0.06 0.02
-0.06
0.12
0.02
-0.06
0.03
0.05
0.06
0.18
-0.01
1.00
0.01
wildfire_since
0.09 0.21
0.07
0.06
0.08
-0.07
0.00
0.03
0.14
0.05
0.08
-0.01
1.00

Senate Correlation
Tables

Table 8
House Correlation Table
tropical_
less_then_ bachelor_
oldage_de
income_ drought_ flooding cyclone_ wildfire_
year vote incumbant highschool or_more turnout pendency non_white per_capita since
_since since
since
year
1.00 -0.01
-0.06
-0.38
0.42
0.11
0.54
0.14
0.77
0.14
0.14
0.12
0.18
vote
-0.01 1.00
0.75
0.07
0.20
0.01
-0.01
0.10
0.16
0.01
-0.02
-0.01
0.10
incumbant
-0.06 0.75
1.00
0.04
0.17
0.01
-0.06
0.06
0.10
-0.01
0.01
-0.05
0.08
less_then_highschool -0.38 0.07
0.04
1.00
-0.39
-0.53
-0.51
0.25
-0.36
0.17
0.03
0.09
0.09
bachelor_or_more
0.42 0.20
0.17
-0.39
1.00
0.15
0.11
0.19
0.80
0.01
-0.02
-0.01
0.15
turnout
0.11 0.01
0.01
-0.53
0.15
1.00
0.28
0.23
0.10
-0.06
0.00
-0.10
-0.04
oldage_dependency
0.54 -0.01
-0.06
-0.51
0.11
0.28
1.00
0.07
0.37
-0.15
0.02
0.03
0.02
non_white
0.14 0.10
0.06
0.25
0.19
-0.23
-0.07
1.00
0.22
-0.03
0.03
0.04
0.08
income_per_capita
0.77 0.16
0.10
-0.36
0.80
0.10
0.37
0.22
1.00
0.13
0.08
0.07
0.28
drought_since
0.14 0.01
-0.01
0.17
0.01
-0.06
-0.15
0.03
0.13
1.00
-0.04
0.17
0.02
flooding_since
0.14 -0.02
0.01
0.03
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.03
0.08
-0.04
1.00
-0.02
0.18
tropical_cyclone_since 0.12 -0.01
-0.05
0.09
-0.01
-0.10
0.03
0.04
0.07
0.17
-0.02
1.00
-0.03
wildfire_since
0.18 0.10
0.08
0.09
0.15
-0.04
0.02
0.08
0.28
0.02
0.18
-0.03
1.00

House Correlation
Tables
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APPENDIX B – OUTPUT TABLES
Table 9
Senate Regression Output Table
(Regression 2)
(Regression 1)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------incumbant
13.018***
11.334***
(1.429)
(1.290)
less_then_highschool

1.631***
(0.501)

1.882***
(0.510)

bachelor_or_more

-0.551
(0.503)

-0.339
(0.512)

turnout

0.181**
(0.071)

0.175**
(0.073)

oldage_dependency

0.579
(0.707)

0.744
(0.716)

non_white

0.362
(0.702)

0.286
(0.719)

income_per_capita

0.123
(0.171)

0.117
(0.175)

drought_since

0.044
(0.186)

0.365***
(0.130)

flooding_since

0.032
(0.087)

0.047
(0.079)

tropical_cyclone_since

0.023***
(0.008)

0.018**
(0.008)

wildfire_since

1.631***
(0.423)

0.133***
(0.031)

incumbant:drought_since

-0.278
(0.347)

incumbant:flooding_since

0.073
(0.197)

incumbant:tropical_cyclone_since

-0.022
(0.030)

incumbant:wildfire_since

-1.492***
(0.420)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Observations
314
314
R2
0.402
0.361
Adjusted R2
0.249
0.210
F Statistic
11.174*** (df = 15; 249)
13.017*** (df = 11; 253)
=============================================================================
Note:
*p<0.1; **p<0.05;***p<0.01
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Table 10
House Regression Output Table
(Regression 2)
(Regression 1)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------incumbant
16.941***
16.664***
(0.507)
(0.479)
less_then_highschool

2.127***
(0.186)

2.119***
(0.186)

bachelor_or_more

0.297*
(0.173)

0.305*
(0.173)

turnout

0.153***
(0.024)

0.153***
(0.024)

oldage_dependency

0.363
(0.298)

0.319
(0.299)

-0.921***
(0.312)

-0.918***
(0.312)

income_per_capita

0.473***
(0.071)

0.472***
(0.071)

drought_since

0.018
(0.031)

-0.040*
(0.024)

flooding_since

-0.052
(0.036)

-0.033
(0.030)

tropical_cyclone_since

0.003*
(0.002)

0.005***
(0.002)

wildfire_since

0.017*
(0.009)

-0.002
(0.005)

non_white

incumbant:drought_since

-0.131***
(0.045)

incumbant:flooding_since

0.071
(0.063)

incumbant:tropical_cyclone_since

0.009***
(0.003)

incumbant:wildfire_since

-0.028***
(0.011)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------Observations
4,032
4,032
R2
0.308
0.304
Adjusted R2
0.217
0.213
F Statistic
105.747*** (df = 15; 3560)
141.548*** (df = 11; 3564)
=============================================================================
Note:
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

